Andrew Shephardson contends in Who’s Afraid of the Unmoved Mover that the combined postmodern objections of Carl A. Raschke, James K. A. Smith, and me, to natural theology, fail. Here I focus only on the issue of idolatry and natural theology, as one way of demonstrating a fundamental inadequacy characteristic of Shephardson’s rebuttal of postmodern challenges to evangelical appropriations of natural theology. I argue that contrary to Shephardson’s contention, Acts 17 does not support evangelical appropriations of natural theology, but operates (...) with a view of reason consistent with my postmodern one and opens postmodern possibilities for understanding natural revelation. (shrink)

Bradley N. Seeman charges that my book, The End of Apologetics: Christian Witness in a Postmodern Context, tends toward “the idolatry of linguistic license.” I point out some ways this runs against the text of the book and then outline a Wittgensteinian approach to language and truth that is alethically “quasi-realist.” On this view truth is both epistemic, or deflationary, in the sense that it depends upon assertability conditions for its truth values, while there is also a nonepistemic, realist (...) component to truth in that these assertability conditions derive from forms of life that involve precognitive involvement with extralinguistic affairs. (shrink)

Bradley N. Seeman has argued that The End of Apologetics comes perilously close to what he calls “the idolatry of linguistic license.” Despite my recent reply, Seeman continues to have a few concerns about my position. I offer a clarification regarding my description of theological language as “poetics,” and argue that it is a way of acknowledging the contingency of all theological descriptions and vocabularies. I also counter Seeman’s insistence on trans-language game truth-makers by noting that it begs the (...) central issue of my “alethic quasi realism,” and argue that this is not a thoroughly deflated concept of truth. (shrink)

In “Idolatry and the End of Apologetics,” I worried that while continental philosophy can aid Christian philosophers and theologians, it can also tempt us toward the “Idolatry of Linguistic License”—an idolatry which sets God so far beyond our words that we deny God’s normative place in the community of speakers while safeguarding our autonomy vis-à-vis God. My essay suggested that some passages in Myron Bradley Penner’s helpful book, The End of Apologetics, might pass too close to the (...) Idolatry of Linguistic License. In Penner’s irenic reply he affirmed that the Idolatry of Linguistic License is a real worry, but protested that I had misread him at several points. This response seeks to continue that irenic tone in a discussion of three points where I still have some questions. (shrink)

Myron Penner’s work shows some ways continental philosophy could strengthen apologetics. In particular, continental philosophy can serve what Francis Schaeffer called “the final apologetic” by exposing idols that keep us from living lives of “costly, observable love.” Yet continental philosophy can also imperil apologetics and theology. The worst danger stems from what I call the “idolatry of linguistic license,” a type of idolatry where linguistic criticism denies God a place in the normative community of speakers. Although the idolatry (...) of linguistic license mars some recent critiques of apologetics inspired by continental philosophy, apologetics would still profit from measured use of continental philosophy. (shrink)

Some claim that cognitive science of religion (CSR) either completely “explains religion away,” or at the very least calls the epistemic status of religious belief into question. Others claim that religious beliefs are the cognitive outputs of systems that seem highly reliable in other contexts, and thus CSR provides positive epistemic support for religious belief. I argue that (i) CSR does not provide evidence for atheism, but (ii) if one is an atheist, CSR lends “intellectual aid and comfort,” (iii) CSR (...) does not provide evidence for theism, but (iv) if one is a theist, CSR provides qualified support for Reformed Epistemology. (shrink)

Some claim that cognitive science of religion either completely “explains religion away,” or at the very least calls the epistemic status of religious belief into question. Others claim that religious beliefs are the cognitive outputs of systems that seem highly reliable in other contexts, and thus CSR provides positive epistemic support for religious belief. I argue that CSR does not provide evidence for atheism, but if one is an atheist, CSR lends “intellectual aid and comfort,” CSR does not provide evidence (...) for theism, but if one is a theist, CSR provides qualified support for Reformed Epistemology. (shrink)

Addresses the perils and promises postmodernity holds for the tasks of Christian thinkers.

In a recent paper, Guy Kahane asks whether God’s existence is something we should want to be true. Expanding on some cryptic remarks from Thomas Nagel, Kahane’s informative and wide-ranging piece eventually addresses whether personal anti-theism is justified, where personal anti-theism is the view that God’s existence would make things worse overall for oneself. In what follows, I develop, defend, but ultimately reject the Meaningful Life Argument, according to which if God’s existence precludes the realization of certain goods that seem (...) to an agent to constitute a meaningful life, it is rational for an agent both to believe that personal anti-theism is true and to prefer that God not exist. (shrink)

Selon Kirk Lougheed, favoriser une version objective de l’argument du sens de la vie établit une sorte d’antithéisme, c’est-à-dire une perspective qui maintient que l’existence d’un Dieu théiste aggraverait les choses et qu’il est donc plus rationnel de préférer que Dieu n’existe pas. Cette version objective est présentée par Lougheed comme une amélioration par rapport à ma version subjective de l’argument du sens de la vie. Je soutiens que la version de Lougheed ne réussit pas mieux que la version subjective (...) que j’ai développée, puis rejetée. (shrink)

Pro-theism is the view that God’s existence would be good in that God’s existence increases the value of a world. Anti-theism is the view that God’s existence would decrease the value of a world. We develop and defend the morally good agent argument for pro-theism. The basic idea is that morally good agents tend to add value to states of affairs, and God, moral agent par excellence is no exception. Thus, we argue that the existence of God would be, on (...) balance, a good thing and therefore something that one can rationally desire to be true. (shrink)

Klaas J. Kraay argues that the rational choice model for divine creation—according to which God chooses to actualize one world among possible alternatives based on its axiological properties—cannot succeed given failures of comparability across possible worlds. I argue that failure of comparability across worlds would not undermine the rationality of choosing one world to create among possible alternatives.

The following paper is an exposition and analysis of Deleuze and Guattari's (hereafter called D&G) vision for philosophy. In sections I and II I discuss two defining features of this vision: respectively, the philosopher as creator and the concept as the philosopher's creation. In the final section I argue that D&G's vision is supported by a normative principle that is itself not intuitively obvious. I conclude that while D&G's vision for philosophy charts out a brave space for philosophy, one may (...) adopt the spirit of their vision without embracing their normative principle. (shrink)

While still under the shadow of decades of trauma, a recontexualized conversation about Anabaptist theology and identity emerges in this volume that is ecumenically engaged, philosophically astute, psychologically attuned, and resolutely vulnerable. The volume offers a Trinitarian and Christological framework that holds together the importance of Scripture, tradition, and the lived experience of the Christian community, as the contributors examine a wide variety of issues such as Mennonite feminism, Anabaptist queer theology, and Mennonite theological methods. These essays interrogate the operations (...) of power, violence, exclusion, and privilege in methodology in this changed context, offering self-critical constructive alternatives for articulating Anabaptist theology and identity. (shrink)

For many species that reproduce sexually, how sex is expressed at different points across lifespan is highly contingent and dependent on various environmental factors. For example, in many species of fish, environmental cues can trigger a natural process of sex transition where a female transitions to male. For many species of turtle, incubation temperature influences the likelihood that turtle eggs will hatch males or females. What is the case for Homo sapiens? Is human sex expression influenced by contingent environmental factors (...) like we see in fish and turtles, with whom we share common ancestry and DNA? Our paper explores the current biological science of sex determination and how it applies to philosophical and theological accounts of the human person. We argue that while human sex determination is not susceptible to environmental cues to the same degree we see in other species, there is sufficient variability among the pathways of human sex development to complicate simplistic biological categories of male and female. (shrink)

According to scientific realists, the predictive success of mature theories provides a strong epistemic basis for thinking that such theories are approximately true. However, we know that many theories once regarded as well-confirmed and predictively successful were eventually replaced with successor theories, and some claim this undermines the epistemic confidence we should have in the approximate truth of current science. Selective scientific realists in turn argue that if one can show that the predictive success of some rejected theory T is (...) a function of theoretical claims consistent with current science, then T’s failure doesn’t undermine the claim that current successful theories are approximately true. As such, Selective Scientific Realism (SSR) can be tested through historical examples. Showing that the predictive success of a failed theory is the result of theoretical features later rejected provides a counterexample to SSR. Conversely, SSR is supported if its explanation of the predictive success of failed theories--namely, that the factors which lead to predictive success in the failed theory survive in the successor theory--is able to handle a wide array of historical cases. (shrink)

In “The Natural Ontological Attitude,” Arthur Fine attempts to provide a way out of the realist/antirealist dichotomy in philosophy of science. Says Fine, the natural way of treating the ontological status of theoretical entities is not to form speculative metaphysical theories, be they realist or antirealist, but instead is to apply a homely version of Tarskian semantics. I argue that Fine’s position depends on two deficient maxims, and therefore does not provide a compelling way out of the realist/antirealist dichotomy. Fine’s (...) Maxim (FM) prohibits the possibility of inferring justified metaphysical theses from the truth-value of existence claims. Hilbert’s Maxim (HM) asserts that metatheoretic arguments are cogent only if they adhere to stricter standards than their constituent theories. I argue that (FM) is likely false, but even if true cannot be rationally believed. I further argue that (HM) is a deficient standard for theory justification due to the problem of infinite regress. (shrink)

In “The Natural Ontological Attitude,” Arthur Fine attempts to provide a way out of the realist/antirealist dichotomy in philosophy of science. Says Fine, the natural way of treating the ontological status of theoretical entities is not to form speculative metaphysical theories, be they realist or antirealist, but instead is to apply a homely version of Tarskian semantics. I argue that Fine’s position depends on two deficient maxims, and therefore does not provide a compelling way out of the realist/antirealist dichotomy. Fine’s (...) Maxim (FM) prohibits the possibility of inferring justified metaphysical theses from the truth-value of existence claims. Hilbert’s Maxim (HM) asserts that metatheoretic arguments are cogent only if they adhere to stricter standards than their constituent theories. I argue that (FM) is likely false, but even if true cannot be rationally believed. I further argue that (HM) is a deficient standard for theory justification due to the problem of infinite regress. (shrink)

In Who’s Afraid of the Unmoved Mover? Postmodernism and Natural Theology, I defend natural theology against its postmodern evangelical detractors, including Myron Bradley Penner. Penner rejects natural theology because it attempts to ground knowledge of God in human reason, and he claims that my treatment of Acts 17:16–34 is fatal to my argument. However, Penner does not engage my explication of the doctrine of general revelation. The catastrophic effects that Penner perceives turn out to (...) be only against a straw man of the version of natural theology that I defend. (shrink)

No single theory so far proposed gives a wholly satisfactory account of the origin and maintenance of bird-song dialects. This failure is the consequence of a weak comparative literature that precludes careful comparisons among species or studies, and of the complexity of the issues involved. Complexity arises because dialects seem to bear upon a wide range of features in the life history of bird species. We give an account of the principal issues in bird-song dialects: evolution of vocal learning, experimental (...) findings on song ontogeny, dialect descriptions, female and male reactions to differences in dialect, and population genetics and dispersal.We present a synthetic theory of the origin and maintenance of song dialects, one that accommodates most of the different systems reported in the literature. The few data available suggest that large, regional dialect populations are genetically differentiated; this pattern is correlated with reduced dispersal between dialects, assortative mating by females, and male-male exclusion. At the same time, “subdialects” may be formed within regional dialects. Subdialect clusters are usually small and may represent vocal mimicry among a few adjacent territorial males. The relative importance of genetic and social adaptation may contribute to the emergence of subdialects; their distinctiveness may be correlated with the degree of polygyny, for example. Thus, subdialect formation is linked to one theory of the evolution of repertoire size, but data are too fragmentary to examine this idea critically. (shrink)

No serious scholar in Christian Social Ethics today can introduce students to his or her field without taking into account the contributions of African American scholarship. The long traditions of Christian Social Ethics in the black church, and the innovative research and writing performed by African-American scholars in recent years are now essential components of a critical study of Ethics. Yet up to now, knowing how best to introduce the fruits of African American ethical scholarship to students, particularly those in (...) the survey class, has been difficult. Good resources exist, yet too often they were not written with the needs of introductory students in mind. This book meets that need by providing an overview of the most important developments in African American approaches to Christian Social Ethics. Written with the needs of beginning students in mind, it will offer insight into the particular ways that African American scholarship has shaped the world of Christian Ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, I make two claims: an opera’s music, both vocal and instrumental, is part of the ontology of its fictional world, and song constitutes the normative mode of communication and expression in the fictional world. I refute Carolyn Abbate’s influential arguments that both of these claims are untrue. Abbate’s contention that opera characters do not have epistemic access to the music is based on false premises and gives rise to serious interpretive problems. My account of operatic metaphysics refines (...) and extends the work of Edward T. Cone and Peter Kivy. Where I diverge from their respective accounts is in my contention that the orchestral music typically does not have a fictional author. Often its real author is the only agent to which it may be logically attributed. (shrink)

The recently proposed ``infinite decision puzzle'' is based on incorrect mathematics.

Mereological nihilism is the view that no objects have proper parts. Despite how counter‐intuitive it is, it is taken quite seriously, largely because it solves a number of puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects – or so its proponents claim. In this article, I show that for every puzzle that mereological nihilism solves, there is a similar puzzle that (a) it doesn’t solve, and (b) every other solution to the original puzzle does solve. Since the solutions to the new (...) puzzles apply just as well to the old puzzles, the old puzzles provide no motivation to be a mereological nihilist. (shrink)

In this paper, I articulate and argue for a new truthmaker view of ontological commitment, which I call the “General Truthmaker View”: when one affirms a sentence, one is ontologically committed to there being something that makes true the proposition expressed by the sentence. This view comes apart from Quinean orthodoxy in that we are not ontologically committed to the things over which we quantify, and it comes apart from extant truthmaker views of ontological commitment in that we are not (...) ontologically committed to the truthmakers of our sentences. (shrink)

This book is an inquiry into the motivation for altruistic behavior. It uncovers the condition that prompts or sometimes even compels us to act intentionally for the benefit of others. This condition, the pre-reflective experience of another person as a self-conscious individual just like oneself, finds its origin in the very structure of the mind. The essay is a synthesis of evidence from neuroscience, phenomenology, Eastern philosophy, analytic philosophy of mind, and cognitive psychology. Hence, it is an excellent example of (...) work in applied cognitive science. The book includes a critique of the several main approaches to the explanation of the motivation for altruistic behavior: biological, psychological, and philosophical. The path of the main inquiry produces several innovative proposals in the philosophy of mind in addition to the main conclusion. Included in these are a detailed account of the structure of the human mind, an ontological categorization of mental states, a naturalistic explanation of so-called mystical states, a proposal for the role of consciousness in the downward causation of physical events, a new interpretation of the Buddhist doctrine of no-self and a unique view of the nature of love. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a new theory of grounding. The theory has it that grounding is a job description that is realized by different properties in different contexts. Those properties play the grounding role contingently, and grounding is the property that plays the grounding role essentially. On this theory, grounding is monistic, but ‘grounding’ refers to different relations in different contexts. First, I argue against Kit Fine’s monist univocalism. Next, I argue against Jessica Wilson’s pluralist multivocalism. Finally, I introduce (...) monist multivocalism, explicate three versions of it (of which the above is one), and show its advantages. (shrink)

Volume 10, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 300-312.

Historically confined to the disadvantaged ranks of the stratification system, evangelical Christians have increasingly joined the corporate elite, eliciting concern from some and sanguinity from others. Quantitative studies of the effects of religion on executive behavior have thus far shown mixed and inconclusive effects, and those few qualitative analyses that have focused on evangelical business leaders have generally emphasized conflict between religion and business but failed adequately to explore areas of consonance. While evangelical executives do, in fact, experience conflict associated (...) with their professional contexts, this tension arises not because business and religion are inherently opposed, as some have argued, but because evangelical business leaders are made to feel like second-class citizens by members of their own faith communities. Indeed, in cases of apparent conflict between faith and business, evangelical executives insist that it is faith, not business, that must be reconceived. Equipped with an array of strategies for demonstrating that business is a sacred institution and a worthy occupation, evangelical business leaders hope to restore faith in business as they apply their faith in business. In these evangelical executives and their accounts, the "spirit of capitalism," defined by Max Weber as a positive attitude toward both work and wealth, finds ongoing embrace and new expression, with implications for understanding the so-called faith at work movement, evangelicalism, and the role of religion among elites. (shrink)